On June 7 and 8, 1864 the National Union (Republican) convention in Baltimore nominated a Abe Lincoln and Andy Johnson ticket. Among other things, its platform was strongly in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war and strongly opposed to African slavery. Democrat Copperheads wanted to know why the platform was silent on Reconstruction. The Republican-leaning Times of New York said the type of Reconstruction would depend on the Southern attitude after they had been vanquished.
From The New-York Times June 11, 1864:
The Baltimore Platform and the Question of Reconstruction.
The Copperheads, who are nothing if not querulous, complain of the Union platform for not touching upon the question of reconstruction. They say that the supporters of the Administration have different opinions on this cardinal point, and that it was pusillanimously avoided in order to escape discord. They try to make it appear that the seeming unanimity of the Convention was secured only by concealment and evasion.
Now we do not grudge the Copperheads any comfort they can find in this view of the case. They need comfort badly enough, considering their broken fortunes and ruined prospects. They are quite welcome to the fact that loyal men do hold very different opinions on this question of reconstruction, and also to the fancy that the Baltimore Convention was afraid to make an attempt to settle it. It is no discredit to be afraid to do a foolish thing.
The simple truth is that the time has not yet come for a fixed conclusion upon the best mode of reconstruction. Such a decision now by the Union party would be premature, unsafe, and unwise. The prime element in the problem is as yet indeterminable — we mean the disposition of the Southern people after the overthrow of their armies. This, in the very nature of the case, cannot be known except by practical experience after that overthrow takes place. We may speculate about what it will be, ever so confidently, and yet it is nothing but speculation — the stuff that dreams are made off. Too many of the strongest anticipations of even the wisest men have been falsified, in these unprecedented times, to justify any further calculation on the unseen. It may be that when the military power of the Confederacy is broken down, its leaders deprived of the power of further mischief by capital punishment, or imprisonment, or banishment, that the Southern people will realize the utter folly of further opposition, and will cordially avail themselves of an opportunity to come back under the old Government, as free and equal fellow-citizens, prepared to perform every constitutional duty in good faith, and, turning their backs upon the past, to adapt themselves to the new order of things, like sensible practical men. We have ourselves always inclined to the opinion that this would be their disposition. We remember that, though rebellious, their character is yet essentially American; and there is no more active trait in the American character than its readiness to accept and make the best of things as they are. We cannot easily suppose that a people so preeminently practical as all Americans are, should stand out in passive resistance to an unavoidable condition. Yet it may be that the majority of Southerners, high-spirited as they certainly are, may choose to gratify their spirit rather than regard their interests, and may utterly refuse, after the war to return to their obligations as American citizens. They may consider this an admission of past guilt and folly, and an insufferable humiliation; and thus prefer to nourish an undying hate, and to maintain an unbending contumacy.
Now, unless a Copperhead is blinder than an adder, he must see that the method of reconstruction must depend largely upon the fact whether the Southern people, after our military triumph, evince the one or the other of these dispositions. If the rebels, after they have been beaten in the field, will resume their old relations to the National Government, loyally accept its amnesties, take its prescribed oaths, and submit to its laws, the process of reconstruction will neither be difficult nor prolonged. It will, in fact, involve nothing but a reception of their elected Senators and Representatives in the National Capitol, provided these Senators and Representatives shall not be in the category of unpardoned traitors, and must take the oaths required by the laws. On the other hand, if the Southern people should show a determination not to return to their old position, still persisting in rebellion at heart, there would be no alternative but to continue to govern them with the strong arm. Loyal government in every State of the South we are bound to have; and if the Southern people do not choose to furnish it for themselves, it must be furnished for them. The National Government will abide the rule of enmity and treason nowhere. It would sooner grind to powder the State establishing such a rule. All the functions of such a State would have to be kept in abeyance; a military governorship alone would control it until the time came, as it surely would come, sooner or later, either in this generation or the next, when the people, sick of their infatuation, should gladly retake their constitutional rights and obligations.
The Baltimore Convention exhibited simply the plainest common sense in letting this question of reconstruction entirely alone. Without the gift of absolute prescience, there is no such thing as wisely and safely settling this question now. The present business of the party is the maintenance of the war. First subdue the rebels. When that is done, and not before, can it be known what the Southern temper toward the Government will be, and what course of action that temper will make practicable and expedient. We must trust the President and Congress, and, if need be, the loyal States, with their Constitution-amending powers, to settle that, when the time comes, in the light of actual facts. It would be sheer folly to seek to do the thing now.